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ABSTRACT In this paper, secure communication in non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) downlink
system is considered wherein two NOMA users with channel gain difference are paired in each transmission
slot. The user with poor channel condition (weak user) is entrusted, while the user with good channel
condition (strong user) is a potential eavesdropper. The weak user data can be intercepted by the strong
user since the strong user needs to decode the weak user’s message for successive interference cancellation
operation in NOMA. To impair strong user’s eavesdropping capability, weak user’s information-bearing
signal is merged with an artificial signal (AS). Thus, the eavesdropping process requires extra decoding step
at higher power level. The secrecy outage probability of the weak user is derived and provided in closed-form
expression. The weak user faces a choice between transmitting the information-bearing signal with the total
power and the deploying the AS technique, whereas the strong user can choose whether to eavesdrop the
weak user’s message or not. To investigate users’ power-secrecy tradeoffs, their interactions are modeled
as a non-cooperative zero-sum game. The existence of Nash equilibria (NEs) of the proposed game is
first analyzed, and pure and mixed-strategy NE profiles are provided. In addition, numerical simulations
are conducted to validate the analytical results and to prove that AS-Aided proposed scheme enhances the
secrecy performance of NOMA systems while maintaining the NOMA superiority over OMA systems.
INDEX TERMS Game theory, Nash equilibrium, non-orthogonal multiple access, physical layer security,
zero-sum game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been recog-
nized as the potential multiple-access scheme for the future
communication systems, for its appealing features of spectral
efficiency, low latency and user fairness [1]. Unlike previous
multiple access schemes, NOMA differentiates users accord-
ing to their channel conditions to broadcast the information
message at the same time, frequency and code but with dif-
ferent power level. User with better channel condition (strong
user) is allocated with lower power level than that of the
user with poor channel gain (weak user). In order to deploy
downlink NOMA system, two main techniques are involved.
First, superposition coding (SC) is used at the base station
side to build the information message of the paired NOMA
users. Second, successive interference cancellation (SIC) is
performed at the strong users’ terminals side, where the
strong user decodes the information message of the week
user [2], subtracts it from the superimposed message before
decoding his own message. Meanwhile, the weak user treats
the strong user’s message as noise since he is allocated
with higher power level [3]. The fact that strong user has
side-information of the weak user message can be exploited
in cooperative NOMA, where strong user relays weak user’s
messages to increase the reliability of the communication
system [4]. On the other hand, from information security
perspective, this feature threatens the information secrecy of
the system, when the strong user turns into a malicious node.
The open nature of wireless communication necessitates
preventive measures to guarantee secure connection. Yet,
fully secure communication can only be guaranteed bymeans
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of the physical layer (PHY) security [5]. In PHY security
approach, the information secrecy is enhanced by exploiting
both the physical signal’s format in addition to the physical
characteristics of the communication system. PHY security
relies on signal processing tools like beamforming for turning
the physical communication channel’s imperfections to a
source of secrecy. In [5], secrecy rate is proved to be always
positive if the source-destination channel condition is better
than that of the source-eavesdropper channel. Furthermore,
information secrecy can be achieved by artificial noise (AN)
technique even if the source-destination channel is worse than
the source-eavesdropper channel [6]. The optimal power ratio
between the information-bearing and the AN signals in order
tominimize the secrecy outage probability is examined in [7].
In addition, the secrecy outage probability for multiple-input
single-output (MISO) wiretap channel in the presence of
eavesdroppers is derived and provided in closed-form for-
mula. The secrecy outage probability is derived in [8] for
two different cases, with and without the availability of the
channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdroppers at the
base station. On the other hand, a multi-user large scale
AN-aided communication systems with the unavailability of
the eavesdropper’s CSI is investigated in [9]. The ergodic
secrecy sum rate is derived in [9] under both perfect and
imperfect CSI training scenarios.
Exploiting PHY security in NOMA systems has gained a
lot of attention lately. The authors in [10] derive the secrecy
outage probability in downlink NOMA system for several
antenna selection schemes. In [11], the secrecy sum rate
is maximised in a downlink NOMA system consists of
base station, multiple legitimate receivers and an external
eavesdropper. References [12] and [13] investigate enhancing
information security of large-scale NOMA networks under
external eavesdropper scenario. PHY security is enhanced
in the aforementioned system model in [12] by introduc-
ing the concept of protected zone around the source node.
AN technique is exploited in [13] to enhance the secrecy
outage probability of multiple-antenna transmission scenario.
NOMA internal or legitimate eavesdropper case is investi-
gated in [14], where the cell-edge user (weak user) is consid-
ered as a potential eavesdropper who is trying to decode the
cell-centre user’s message in a beamforming NOMA system.
However, in practical scenarios, eavesdroppers are usually
users with good channel condition and they are located near
to the base station, so that the attack will be more energy effi-
cient and more destructive to the network [15]. Such practical
scenario has not been investigated in NOMA system.
Game theory [16] is a mathematical framework used
for modeling of all possible strategies among various
decision-makers who have partly or completely conflicting
goals. Game theory is first adopted in economics to charac-
terize the potential competition among industrial and com-
mercial facilities. Game theory can be classified into two
main types, non-cooperative and cooperative games. In the
first scheme, no information exchange among the differ-
ent players, while in the late, players are collaborating to
enhance the game outcomes. Non-cooperative games are
solved normally by finding its Nash equilibrium (NE), which
can be defined as a profile that no player will gain if he
diverts alone from NE [17]. Whereas, cooperative games
are solved mainly by means of Nash bargaining equilib-
rium or coalition formation [18]. The competition over com-
munications systems’ resources among users motivates a
lot of work to introduce the game theory to tackle the
power allocation problem in wireless networks [19]–[21].
Recently, game-theoretical approach has been exploited in
large scale to enhance the physical layer security of wireless
networks [22]. The authors in [23] adopt the game theory
discipline to enhance the secrecy rate of cognitive radio net-
works. A two-player zero-sum game model in multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) system andmalicious relay scenario
is adopted in [24] and [25] respectively. However, the use of
game theory framework in enhancing the PHY security of
NOMA system remains unexplored.
In this work, a secure MISO downlink NOMA communi-
cation system is considered. In this system, a multi-antenna
base station communicates with two users per transmission
slot. NOMA strong user decodes the weak user’s message
to subtract it by means of SIC process, and hence he can
readily eavesdrop the weak user’s message, if he is a mali-
cious user. In order to impair the strong user capability of
decoding the weak user’s information message, the power
allocated to the weak user is divided to broadcast artificial
signal (AS) in the orthogonal subspace of the weak user’s
direction with a guarantee that the power allocated to weak
user after power dividing is still higher than that of the
strong user. For the potential eavesdropper to extract the
exact weak user’s information-bearing signal from the com-
bined signal, extra decoding process at higher power level
is required. The weak user can decode his message as the
power allocated to him is still higher than that of the strong
user. Since the AS scheme requires the total power split
from theweak user perceptive, and the eavesdropping process
requires higher SINR and extra decoding processes from the
strong user side, both weak and strong users can choose
between exploiting the AS scheme or not and to eavesdrop
or not respectively. The possible interactions between both
users and the energy-security trade-off outcomes are modeled
as a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game, wherein
the secrecy capacity is considered as the utility function.
The game is first formulated and its NE is proved to exist.
Furthermore, pure and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are
proposed to provide an eavesdropping avoidance strategy.
In addition, weak user’s secrecy outage probability is pro-
vided in closed-form formula, and Monte Carlo simulations
are performed to validate the obtained results. To the best
of the authors’ knowledge, the case where NOMA strong
user is the potential eavesdropper has not been dealt with
before in literature. Considering NOMA strong user as the
malicious node is more realistic for two reasons, i) NOMA
strong user knows the information message of the weak user
in order to decode his message; ii) Eavesdropper is usually
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node with strong channel condition. Furthermore, this work
introduces the game theory and zero-summodel in enhancing
the PHY security of NOMA systems for the first time in the
literature. The proposed AS-aided secure scheme is proved to
enhance the secrecy performance of NOMA system without
affecting its functionalities or its superiority over the conven-
tional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) systems. Table I,
represents the main notations adopted in this work.
TABLE 1. Table of notation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Secure communication in downlink single cell NOMA
system is considered, where a multi-antenna base station
equipped with N antennas communicates with L single
antenna users. Without loss of generality, base station-users
channels are arranged in ascending order ‖h1w1‖2 ≤
. . . . . . ‖hmwm‖2 ≤ ‖hnwn‖2 ≤ . . . ‖hLwL‖2, where wk
is the beamforming weight vector for user k . The chan-
nel gain represents Rayleigh fading multiplied by the path
loss. In each transmission time, two spatially separated
users are paired, denoted as m-th and n-th receivers with
(m < n), under the potential malicious attempt of the strong
user n eavesdropping the m-th user’s information message.
We assume that perfect CSI of both paired users is avail-
able at the transmitter. In order to impair the strong user’s
capability of decoding the weak user’s message, the weak
user’s information-bearing signal is combined with an AS.
Hence, if the strong user wants to intercept the weak user’s
information-bearing message, he has to extract it from the
combined signal.
The principle of masking the beamformed broadcast infor-
mation with the AS to confuse the strong user will simulate
the AN technique [6] and can be outlined as follows: An
N × N matrix Wm = [wm Vm] that its columns form an
orthogonal basis of CN is introduced. The first column of the
matrix is given by wm = h
†
m‖hm‖ , while Vm is a N × (N − 1)
matrix with orthogonal columns.
Thus, the superimposed beamformed message for the two
corresponding receivers can be expressed as
x = wnsn + wmsm + Vmem (1)
where sn and sm, are the information-bearing signals for the
n-th and the m-th users respectively, with E(| sn |2) = σ 2sn =
anP, E(| sm |2) = σ 2sm = βamP. P is the total transmit power,
an, and am are the NOMA power coefficients for user n and
m respectively, with an < am and an+am = 1. β is the power
splitting coefficient between information-bearing and the AS
with an < βam. em is N − 1 vector, its elements are indepen-
dent artificial codewords each with variance (1−β)amP(N−1) , and
wn = h
†
n‖hn‖ is the beamforming vector of the strong user n.
The signal received at the n-th user can be expressed as
yn = hnwnsn + hnwmsm + hnVmem + nn (2)
where hn is the complex channel vector between base station
and strong user, and nn ∼ CN (0, σ 2) is the additive white
complex Gaussian noise (AWGN) signal. In the proposed
scheme, strong user decodes the weak user’s information
message combined with the AS to be subtracted by means
of SIC process, and then proceed to decode his own message.
The SINR at the strong user to remove the weak user’ mes-
sage combined with the AS signal (to perform SIC) is
γnm =
βam‖hn h
†
m‖hm‖‖
2
+ (1−β)amN−1 ‖hnVm2‖
an‖hn‖2 + 1ρ
(3)
where ρ = P
σ 2
is the transmit signal to noise ratio (SNR).
While the SINR to detect the information-bearing signals to
the weak at the strong user n, i.e., internal eavesdropper
γ evenm =
βam‖hn h
†
m‖hm‖‖
2
an‖hn‖2 + (1−β)amN−1 ‖hnVm‖2 + 1ρ
. (4)
The signal received at the weak user m is given by
ym = hm h
†
m
‖hm‖ sm + hmwnsn + nm (5)
where hm is the complex channel vector between the weak
user m and the base station, nm ∼ CN (0, σ 2) is the AWGN,
(Note that we assume that σ 2n = σ 2m = σ 2).
The SINR needed by the weak user to decode his own
information message
γm = βam‖hm‖
2
an‖hm h
†
n‖hn‖‖
2
+ 1
ρ
. (6)
The instantaneous secrecy capacity of the weak userm can be
expressed as
Cm = [log2(1+ γm)− log2(1+ γ evenm )]+ (7)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
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While the secrecy outage probability which is defined as
the probability that the secrecy capacity is less than a certain
target rate, can be expressed as
PSout,m = P{Cm < Rm}
=
∫ ∞
0
Fγm (τmx + τm − 1) fγ evenm (x)dx (8)
where τm = 2Rm , and Rm is the target rate at user m, FX (.)
is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random
variable X , and fX (.) its probability density function (PDF).
Hence, in order to calculate the secrecy outage probability,
the CDF of γm, and the PDF of γ evenm are needed.
The CDF of the SINR at weak user m can be expressed as
Fγm (x) = P{γm ≤ x}
= P
{
‖hm‖2 ≤ x
βam
(an‖hm h
†
n
‖hn‖‖
2
+ 1
ρ
)
}
=
∫ ∞
0
FX
(
x
βam
(any+ 1
ρ
)
)
fY (y)dy (9)
where X = ‖hm‖2 obeys Gamma distribution Gamma(N , 1)
and Y = ‖hm h
†
n‖hn‖‖
2
follows the exponential distribution with
unit mean. Hence, the CDF of γm can be expressed as
Fγm (x)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
N−1∑
i=0
x i
i! (
an
βam
y+ 1
βamρ
)ie−(
anx
βam
y+ x
βamρ
)e−ydy
= 1−
N−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
1
i!
(
i
j
)( an
βam
)j( 1
βamρ
)i−jx ie−( xβamρ )
∫ ∞
0
yje−(
anx
βam
)ye−ydy
= 1−8 x
i
(1+ an
βam
x)j+1
exp
(− x
βamρ
)
(10)
where 8 =∑N−1i=0 ∑ij=0 1(i−j)!( anβam )j( 1βamρ )i−j.
In order to calculate the PDF of γnm, we will derive its CDF
first, then the PDF can be obtained by the deriving the CDF
formula. The CDF of γnm can be expressed as
Fγ evenm (x) = P{γnm ≤ x}
= P
{
βam‖hn h
†
m‖hm‖‖
2
an‖hn‖2 + (1−β)amN−1 ‖hnVm‖2 + 1ρ
≤ x
}
= P
{
Z ≤ x
βam
(I + 1
ρ
)
}
(11)
where Z = ‖hn h
†
m‖hm‖‖
2
follows the exponential distribution
with unit mean, and I = an‖hn‖2 + (1−β)amN−1 ‖hnVm‖2,
‖hn‖2 obeys the Gamma distribution i.e., ∼ Gamma(N , 1),
then an‖hn‖2 ∼ Gamma(N , an). The elements of hnVm
are random independent Gaussian distributed with zero
mean and unit variance then the distribution of ‖hnVm‖2 is
Gamma(N − 1, 1), and (1−β)amN−1 ‖hnVm‖2 ∼ Gamma(N −
1, (1−β)amN−1 ). The sumof two Integer Gamma functions follows
the generalized integer Gamma distribution [26], with PDF
equals to
fI (z) = θ0
(
θ1
zk−1
(k − 1)!e
−anz + θ2 z
k−1
(k − 1)!e
− N−1(1−β)am z
)
(12)
where θ1= (−1)N−1∑Nk=1 aN−k+1,N−1( 1an− N−1(1−β)am )k−(2N−1),
θ2 = (−1)N ∑N−1k=1 aN−k,N ( N−1(1−β)am − 1an )k−(2N−1), θ0 =
( 1an )
N ( N−1(1−β)am )
N−1, and aN−k+1,N−1 =
(2N−k−2
N−2
)
, aN−k,N =(2N−k−2
N−1
)
.
Then the CDF of γnm is given by
Fγ evenm (x)
= 1− e− xβamρ
∫ ∞
0
e−
x
βam
zfI (z)dz
= 1− e− xβamρ θ0
[
θ1
( x
βam
+ 1an )k
+ θ2
( x
βam
+ N−1(1−β)am )k
]
.
(13)
By the derivation of Fγ evenm (x) we have
fγ evenm (x) =
θ0
βamρ
e−
x
βamρ
[
θ1
( x
βam
+ 1an )k
+ θ2
( x
βam
+ N−1(1−β)am )k
+ ρθ1k
( x
βam
+ 1an )k+1
+ ρθ2k
( x
βam
+ N−1(1−β)am )k+1
]
. (14)
Theorem 1: Assuming NOMA downlink system, where AS
is generated at the base station to impair the strong user capa-
bility of decoding the weak user m’s information messages,
then the secrecy outage probability of the weak user can be
expressed as
PSout,m = 1− (15)
where
 = θ0
βamρ
exp
(
− (τm − 1)
βamρ
)
84(
βam
anτm
)j+10(t + 1)[
θ1(βam)k
(−1)j+k+1
0(k)0(j+ 1)∂
j
b∂
k−1
c1(
1
c1 − b
[
bteba0(−t, ba)− ct1eac10(−t, c1a)
])
+ ρθ1 k(βam)k+1 (−1)
j+k+2
0(k + 1)0(j+ 1)∂
j
b∂
k
c1(
1
c1 − b
[
bteba0(−t, ba)− ct1eac10(−t, c1a)
])
+ θ2(βam)k (−1)
j+k+1
0(k)0(j+ 1)∂
j
b∂
k−1
c2(
1
c2 − b
[
bteba0(−t, ba)− ct2eac20(−t, c2a)
])
+ ρθ2 k(βam)k+1 (−1)
j+k+2
0(k + 1)0(j+ 1)∂
j
b∂
k
c2(
1
c2 − b
[
bteba0(−t, ba)− ct2eac20(−t, c2a)
])]
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with a = τm+1
βamρ
, b = βam
τman
+1− 1
τm
, c1 = βaman , c2 =
β(N−1)
(1−β) , ∂
j
x
is the partial derivative of the order j with respect to x, 4 =∑i
t=0
(i
t
)
τ tm(τm − 1)i−t and 0(., .) is the upper incomplete
gamma function.
Proof: The secrecy outage probability of userm is given
by
PSout,m
=
∫ ∞
0
Fγm (τmx + τm − 1) fγ evenm (x)dx
= 1−8
∫ ∞
0
e−
(τmx+τm−1)
βamρ (τmx + τm − 1)i(
1+ an
βam
(τmx + τm − 1)
)j+1 fγ evenm (x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸

.
(16)
By applying (14) and some further manipulations, the term
can be expressed as
 = θ0
βamρ
∫ ∞
0
exp(− (τmx+τm−1)
βamρ
)(τmx + τm − 1)i(
1+ an
βam
(τmx + τm − 1)
)j+1
exp(− x
βamρ
)
[
θ1
( x
βam
+ 1an )k
+ θ2
( x
βam
+ N−1(1−β)am )k
+ ρθ1k
( x
βam
+ 1an )k+1
+ ρθ2k
( x
βam
+ N−1(1−β)am )k+1
]
dx
= θ0
βamρ
exp
(
− (τm − 1)
βamρ
)
(
βam
anτm
)j+1
×
i∑
t=0
(
i
t
)
τ tm(τm − 1)i−t
∫ ∞
0
e−
τm+1
βamρ
xx t
( βam
τman
+1− 1
τm
+ x)j+1
[
θ1(βam)k(
x + βaman
)k + ρθ1(βam)(k+1)(x+ βaman )(k+1)
+ θ2(βam)
k(
x + β(N−1)(1−β)
)k + ρθ2(βam)(k+1)(x + β(N−1)(1−β) )(k+1)
]
dx
= θ0
βamρ
exp
(
− (τm − 1)
βamρ
)
4(
βam
anτm
)j+1
∫ ∞
0
e−axx t
(b+x)j+1[
θ1(βam)k
(x+c1)k +
ρθ1(βam)(k+1)
(x+c1)(k+1) +
θ2(βam)k
(x+c2)k +
ρθ2(βam)(k+1)
(x+c2)(k+1)
]
dx.
(17)
We have∫ ∞
0
e−axx t
(x + b)j+1(x + c)k
= (−1)
j+k+1
0(k)0(j+1)∂
j
b∂
k−1
c
(
1
c−b
∫ ∞
0
[
e−axx t
x + b −
e−axx t
x + c
])
dx
= (−1)
j+k+1
0(k)0(j+ 1)∂
j
b∂
k−1
c(
1
c−b
[
bteba0(t+1)0(−t, ba)− cteca0(t+1)0(−t, ca)
])
.
By substituting in (17), (15) can be obtained. The proof is
completed.
III. GAME-THEORETICAL APPROACH
In this section, the proposed wiretap model is formulated
as non-cooperative two players zero-sum game. Wherein the
utility function is considered as the secrecy capacity between
the both users. Non-cooperative zero-sum game is the natural
model as the weak user tries to maximize the utility function
to secure his information and the strong user attempts to
minimize it.
A. NON-COOPERATIVE STRATEGIC GAMES
Strategic non-cooperative games involve competitive
decision-makers having either partially or totally conflicting
interests in the utility outcome function. More formally,
a non-cooperative game in strategic form is defined as
follows [18]:
Definition 1: The strategic non-cooperative game is a
triplet G = (Np, (Si)i∈Np , (ui)i∈Np ) where:
• Np is the set of players, i.e., Np = {1, . . . ,Np}.
• (Si) is the available strategies for player i, ∀i ∈ NP.
• ui is the utility function of the i, ∀i ∈ NP.
Two-player zero-sum game is one of most commonmodels
of non-cooperative games. It involves two players with the
same utility function but with completely opposite interests,
where the gain of one player equals to the loss of the second
player. In other words, in two-player zero-sum game one
player is trying to maximize the utility function whereas the
other attempts to minimize it. Zero-sum game is the natural
game model for secure communication system games, as the
legitimate user is trying to improve the secrecy performance
of the system under the malicious user attempts to reduce it.
The most common solution for the majority of
non-cooperative game models is that of NE [18]. NE is
first introduced by John Nash in his seminal work [17], can
be defined as the state where no player can enhance its
utility outcome by choosing another strategy, if the other
players maintain the NE strategies. NE can be defined as
follows [27]:
Definition 2: We say that the strategy profile s∗ ∈ S
where S = S1 × . . .Si × . . .SNp is a Nash equilibrium of
a non-cooperative game G = (Np, (Si)i∈Np , (ui)i∈Np ) if
ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀i ∈ Np, ∀si ∈ Si (18)
where S−i denotes the available strategies for all players
except the player i.
B. GAME FORMULATION
In the proposed secure NOMA model, the weak user can
choose between transmitting with total power or splitting this
power to deploy the AS scheme to enhance the secrecy per-
formance. The strong user chooses whether to eavesdrop with
higher power and extra decoding process or not to eavesdrop
in order to maintain his power to perform his functionalities.
To express both players energy-security trade-offs we will
formulate the proposed secure NOMA zero-sum game G =
(Np, (Si)i∈Np , (ui)i∈Np ) as follows:
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TABLE 2. Utility function matrix of the secure NOMA zero-sum game.
• Np = 1, 2 is the set of weak and strong players.
• (S = Sm × Sn) denotes the compact strategic action
space for both players, where Sm, Sn are the avail-
able strategies for the weak and strong players respec-
tively. User m asks the base station to transmit with
’Total power’ allocatedwithout considering the potential
threat of the strong user, this strategy will be denoted
by T , or to deploy the ’AS’ scheme and protect his
information-bearing signal by dividing the total power
between information-bearing and artificial signals with
ratio β, we denote this strategy as A. Hence, the avail-
able strategies set for the weak player can be expressed
as Sm = {T ,A}. Strong user can choose between two
strategies, either to push more power and ’Eavesdrop’
the weak user message at higher SINR ratios denoted
by E . Or the ’Not eavesdrop’ strategy to maintain the
available power for his own functionalities denoted
byN . Therefore, the strategic space of the strong user is
expressed as Sm = {E,N }.
• The utility function of the proposed game is the instan-
taneous secrecy rate defined by the difference between
the weak user n rate and the rate of decoding his message
by the strong user n, i.e., C = [log2(1+ γm)− log2(1+
γnm)]+.
Based on the game formulation, we can build the utility
matrix for the proposed secure NOMA zero-sum game as
following table,
In the utility matrix, for the (Eavesdrop, Total power)
combination, the weak user is not protecting his information-
bearing signal and the strong user is trying to intercept it.
In this case the strong user will manage to decode the weak
user message and intercept it easily therefore the secrecy
capacity is zero, i.e.,
CT E = 0. (19)
In the (Not eavesdrop, Total power) combination, the weak
user uses all available power for transmitting his information-
bearing signal. As the strong user plays ’Not eavesdrop’, the
eavesdropping rate is zero, i.e., log2(1 + γnm) = 0, and the
utility function for this combination can be written as
CT N = log2(1+
am‖hm‖2
an‖hm h
†
n‖hn‖‖
2
+ 1
ρ
). (20)
For the combination (Eavesdrop, Artificial signal), the weak
users asks the base station to implement the AS scheme and
the strong user tries to intercept the weak user by extracting
it from the AS mixture. Hence, the utility function can be
expressed as
CAE =
[
log2(1+
βam‖hm‖2
an‖hm h
†
n‖hn‖‖
2
+ 1
ρ
)
− log2(1+
βam‖hn h
†
m‖hm‖‖
2
an‖hn‖2 + (1−β)amN−1 ‖hnVm‖2 + 1ρ
)
]+
.
(21)
For the (Not eavesdrop, Artificial signal) case, the weak user
is protecting his information message using the AS technique
while the strong user is not trying to intercept it, and hence
the utility function corresponding to this case can be given by
CAN = log2(1+
βam‖hm‖2
an‖hm h
†
n‖hn‖‖2 + 1ρ
). (22)
C. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this subsection, we prove that an NE exists for the
proposed NOMA secrecy non-cooperative zero-sum gain.
To this end, we apply the following Nash equilibria existence
theorem [16].
Theorem 2: A strategic gameG = (Np, (Si)i∈Np , (ui)i∈Np )
has at least one NE if the action set (Si)∀i ∈ Np is non empty,
compact and convex subset of a Euclidean space.
Proof: By definition, the strategy set for each player
(Sm) and (Sn) is not empty and convex. Each user’s strategy
is limited between ’Total power’ and ’AS’ for user m, and
’Eavesdrop’ or ’Not eavesdrop’ for user n. Hence, the strategy
sets are bounded and thus compact. Therefore, the proposed
secrecy NOMA zero-sum gain has at least one NE. The proof
is completed.
D. PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this subsection, we analyses the pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria that the players can reach when moving without
considering the other player’s strategy. Pure-strategy is a
deterministic strategy selection from the strategies space
(with probability equals to one) by a given player. The
pure-strategy NE and its corresponding strategies for the
proposed secure NOMA two-player sum-game are provided
by the following theorem:
Theorem 3: For the proposed NOMA zero-sum game
model and for an arbitrary transmit powers, arbitrary chan-
nel status conditions and arbitrary eavesdropping power and
information to AS power ratio, the pure-strategy NE profile
is given by
C(s∗m, s∗n) = CAE . (23)
Proof: The definition of the utility function and its
possible values presented in the utility matrix in Table 2 imply
the following instantaneous secrecy capacity outcomes order
CT N ≥ CAN ≥ CAE︸︷︷︸
NE
≥ CT E . (24)
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CAE represents the NE profile, since neither the strong nor
weak user can enhance his utility function by changing his
strategy individually, i.e., the instantaneous secrecy capacity
utility will increase if the strong user moves to ’Not eaves-
drop’ strategy instead of ’Eavesdrop’ as the utility function
will change to CAN that has higher utility function value.
Similarly, the utility function value will decrease if the weak
user changes his strategy from ’AS’ to ’Total power’ as the
utility function profile will be CT E that has worse utility
function values. The proof is completed.
Hence, the NE strategies are ’AS’ and ’Eavesdrop’ for
users m and n respectively.
E. MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
In order to tackle the probabilistic nature of the zero-sum
game model, the concept of mixed-strategy is proposed.
Mixed-strategy considers the number of the available strate-
gies and the probabilities corresponding to choosing each
strategy for a given player. The proposed non-cooperative
zero-sum gamemodel is finite (as the sets of strategies Sn and
Sm are finite), then it has a saddle-point in the mixed-strategy
mode [17].
Let us define p = (p, 1 − p), where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is
the probability with which the weak user m plays the ’Total
transmit’ strategy. Hence, 1− p is the probability with which
it plays the ’AS’ strategy. Similarly, we define q = (q, 1−q),
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 is the probability that the strong user plays
the ’Eavesdrop’ strategy and so 1−q is the probability to play
’Not eavesdrop’ strategy.
The weak user reaches his optimal action by solving the
following problem
max
p
min
q
pTCq (25)
where C is the instantaneous secrecy capacity matrix repre-
sented in Table 2, and (.)T is the transpose function.
The strong user obtains his optimal move by solving
min
q
max
p
pTCq. (26)
Solving the above equations yields the optimal probability
value of each strategy for a given user
p∗ = CAN − CAE
CT E + CAN − (CT N + CAE ) (27)
1− p∗ = CT E − CT N
CT E + CAN − (CT N + CAE ) (28)
q∗ = CAN − CT N
CT E + CAN − (CT N + CAE ) (29)
1− q∗ = CT E − CAE
CT E + CAN − (CT N + CAE ) (30)
and hence the unique corresponding mixed-strategy NE value
u∗ of the proposed game is given by
u∗(p∗, q∗) = CT ECAN − CT NCAE
CT E + CAN − (CT N + CAE ) . (31)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulations are provided to validate
the analytical results and to demonstrate the impact of system
parameters on the secrecy performance. The representative
results in the considered network are drawn according to
the following NOMA power allocation coefficient an = 0.2
am = 0.8 for weak and strong user respectively. The users’
locations in the network are assumed to follow the uniform
distribution. Channel model is Rayleigh fading with the path
loss model 128.1 + 37.6 ∗ log(r) dB, where r[Km] is the
distance between the base station and the user terminal.
Total transmit power is 43 dBm, receivers’ noise density
−169 dBm.
FIGURE 1. Secrecy outage probability versus SNR for N = 2,3,4 at
β = 0.8.
The curves shown in Figure 1 represent the analytic out-
age secrecy probability of the weak user (solid line) and
the Monte Carlo simulations (circle dots) as a function of
transmit SNR for different numbers of antenna. The match
between the analytical and the simulated results validates
our derived closed-form expressions of the secrecy outage
probability.
Figure 2 plots the secrecy outage probability versus
antenna number for different values of information to arti-
ficial signals power ratio β. One can notice that increasing
the number of transmit antenna N improves the secrecy
behaviour of the proposed system. This is due to the fact that
the higher the number of antennas the better the quality of
the information signal received by the weak receiver, as the
random variable hm follow the Gamma distribution with N
parameter, i.e., 0(N , 1). Moreover, increasing the antenna
number creates more confusion to the strong user when trying
to intercept the weak user message, in addition to impairing
its eavesdropping SINR (γ evenm ).
In Figure 3, the secrecy outage probability is drawn with
respect to information-bearing signal to AS power coeffi-
cient β, for different number of antenna. β = 1 means that
all power is allocated to the information-bearing signal and
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FIGURE 2. Secrecy outage probability versus number of antennas for
β = 0.4,0.6,0.8 at ρ = 43dBm.
FIGURE 3. Secrecy outage probability versus β for N = 2,3,4 at
ρ = 43dBm.
no artificial signal is injected (conventional NOMA system).
While β = 0 implies that all power is assigned to the artificial
signal and no information exchange. The figure demonstrates
that the secrecy outage probability reaches its lowest value at
β 6= 1 which proves that physical layer security is enhanced
when AS is injected. Of course, not all values of β is available
as its value has to satisfy β ∗ am > an so NOMA system can
be implemented.
Figure 4 plots the capacity region for conventional NOMA,
conventional OMA, the AS-Aided NOMA and the AS-Aided
OMA systems. The comparisons yield that the boundary of
achievable rate pairs of the proposed AS-Aided NOMA is
still outside the AS-Aided OMA capacity region. Therefore,
the proposed secure NOMA system guards the superior-
ity of NOMA system over the OMA system in terms of
system-level throughput. Moreover, the capacity region of
the proposed AS-Aided NOMA scheme is even larger than
that of the conventional OMA system (β = 1) in general.
FIGURE 4. Capacity Regions of NOMA and OMA systems for β = 0.7,1.
Hence, the proposed AS-Aided scheme enhances the secu-
rity aspect of the NOMA system without compromising its
performance.
The curves drawn in Figure 5 represent the zero-sum game
utility functions with the pure and mixed NE values as a
function of the transmit SNR. At low SNR regime the strong
user can eavesdrop the weak user’s information message and
the pure-strategy NE is not optimal. Hence, it is better that
both users randomize over the possible strategies to reach the
mixed-strategy NE which obviously better than the pure NE
(CAE ) at this region. At the point that SNR is high enough and
the eavesdropping power is not sufficient to extract the weak
user’s information-bearing signal from the AS combination,
the pure-strategy NE CAE provides better utility outcomes
and users have to switch to their pure deterministic strategies.
i.e., weak user chooses the ’AS’ strategy and the strong user
plays the ’Eavesdrop’ strategy.
FIGURE 5. Non-cooperative NOMA zero-sum game utility functions.
Figures 6 plots the optimal mixed-strategy probabilities as
a function of transmit SNR. In the region where the strong
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FIGURE 6. Optimal weak and strong users mixed-strategy probabilities.
user’s eavesdropping power is sufficient to intercept the weak
user’s message, users should adopt the mixed-strategy NE
(mixed-strategy region). Once the power is high enough and
hence the power allocated to the AS is sufficient to prevent
the strong user of eavesdropping, the mixed-strategy is not
optimal anymore and users have to use the deterministic
strategies (pure-strategy region). p∗ = 0 implies that weak
user should play the ’AS’ strategy and q∗ = 1 implies that
strong user should play the ’Eavesdrop’ strategy which lead
to the pure-strategy NE profile.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper exploits physical layer security in downlink
NOMA system, to impair the strong user capability of decod-
ing the weak user’s information. To this end, the weak user’s
information-bearing signal is merged with an artificial sig-
nal. The interactions between the legitimate and malicious
user are modeled as strategic non-cooperative two-player
zero-sum game. The weak user is trying to maximize the
secrecy rate while the strong user attempts to minimize
it. A non-cooperative NE profile is obtained in pure and
mixed-strategy scenarios. The secrecy outage probability of
the weak user is provided in closed-form expression. Further-
more, numerical results demonstrate that injecting AS tech-
nique enhances information security, without compromising
the NOMA superiority over OMA systems. The proposed
AS-aided secure scheme can be extended as a future work,
to imperfect or partial CSI scenarios by introducing robust
secure schemes and algorithms.
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